Atif Pedia: Notes

The History of Cooperative Movement

What is a Cooperative Society?

A cooperative (also co-operative or co-op) is a business organization owned and operated by a group of individuals for their mutual benefit. A cooperative is defined by the International Cooperative Alliance's Statement on the Cooperative Identity as "an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise". A cooperative may also be defined as a business owned and controlled equally by the people who use its services or by the people who work there. Various aspects regarding cooperative enterprise are the focus of study in the field of cooperative economics.

The history of the cooperative movement concerns the origins of cooperatives. Although cooperative arrangements, such as mutual insurance, and principles of cooperation existed long before, the cooperative movement began with the application of cooperative principles to business organization.

Beginnings

The cooperative movement began in Europe in the 19th century, primarily in Britain and France, although The Shore Porters Society claims to be one of the world's first cooperative society, being established in Aberdeen in 1498 (although it has since demutualized to become a private partnership). The industrial revolution and the increasing mechanization of the economy transformed society and threatened the livelihoods of many workers. The concurrent labour and social movements and the issues they attempted to address describe the climate at the time.

The first documented consumer cooperative was founded in 1769, in a barely furnished cottage in Fenwick, East Ayrshire, when local weavers manhandled a sack of oatmeal into John Walker's whitewashed front room and began selling the contents at a discount, forming the Fenwick Weavers' Society.

In the decades that followed, several cooperatives or cooperative societies formed including Lennoxtown Friendly Victualing Society, founded in 1812.

By 1830, there were several hundred co-operatives. Some were initially successful, but most cooperatives founded in the early 19th century had failed by 1840. However, Lockhurst Lane Industrial Co-operative Society (founded in 1832 and now Heart of England Co-operative Society), and Galashiels and Hawick Co-operative Societies (1839 or earlier, merged with The Co-operative Group) still trade today.

It was not until 1844 when the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers established the ‘Rochdale Principles’ on which they ran their cooperative, that the basis for development and growth of the modern cooperative movement was established.

Financially, credit unions were invented in Germany in the mid-19th century, first by Franz Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1852, urban), then by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen (1864, rural). While Schulze-Delitzsch is chronologically earlier, Raiffeisen has proven more influential over time. In Britain, the friendly society, building society, and mutual savings bank were earlier forms of similar institutions.

Robert Owen

Robert Owen (1771–1858) is considered the father of the cooperative movement. A Welshman who made his fortune in the cotton trade, Owen believed in putting his workers in a good environment with access to education for themselves and their children. These ideas were put into effect successfully in the cotton mills of New Lanark, Scotland. It was here that the first co-operative store was opened. Spurred on by the success of this, he had the idea of forming "villages of co-operation" where workers would drag themselves out of poverty by growing their own food, making their own clothes and ultimately becoming self-governing. He tried to form such communities in Orbiston in Scotland and in New Harmony, Indiana in the United States of America, but both communities failed.

William King

Although Owen inspired the co-operative movement, others – such as Dr. William King (1786–1865) – took his ideas and made them more workable and practical. King believed in starting small, and realized that the working classes would need to set up co-operatives for themselves, so he saw his role as one of instruction. He founded a monthly periodical called The Co-operator, the first edition of which appeared on 1 May 1828. This gave a mixture of co-operative philosophy and practical advice about running a shop using cooperative principles. King advised people not to cut themselves off from society, but rather to form a society within a society, and to start with a shop because, "We must go to a shop every day to buy food and necessaries - why then should we not go to our own shop?" He proposed sensible rules, such as having a weekly account audit, having 3 trustees, and not having meetings in pubs (to avoid the temptation of drinking profits).

The Rochdale Pioneers

The Rockdale Society of Equitable Pioneers was a group of 10 weavers and 20 others in Rockdale, England, that was formed in 1844. As the mechanization of the Industrial Revolution was forcing more and more skilled workers into poverty, these tradesmen decided to band together to open their own store selling food items they could not otherwise afford. With lessons from prior failed attempts at co-operation in mind, they designed the now famous Rockdale Principles, and over a period of four months they struggled to pool together one pound sterling per person for a total of 28 pounds of capital. On December 21, 1844, they opened their store with a very meager selection of butter, sugar, flour, oatmeal and a few candles. Within three months, they expanded their selection to include tea and tobacco, and they were soon known for providing high quality, unadulterated goods.

The English CWS and Co-operative Group

The Co-operative Group formed gradually over 140 years from the merger of many independent retail societies, and their wholesale societies and federations. In 1863, twenty years after the Rockdale Pioneers opened their co-operative, the North of England Co-operative Society was launched by 300 individual co-ops across Yorkshire and Lancashire. By 1872, it had become known as the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS). Through the 20th century, smaller societies merged with CWS, such as the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (1973) and the South Suburban Co-operative Society (1984).

By the 1990s, CWS's share of the market had declined considerably and many came to doubt the viability of co-operative model. CWS sold its factories to Andrew Regan in 1994. Regan returned in 1997 with a £1.2 billion bid for CWS. There were allegations of "carpet-bagging" - new members who joined simply to make money from the sale - and more seriously fraud and commercial leaks. After a lengthy battle, Regan's bid was seen off and two senior CWS executives were dismissed and imprisoned for fraud. Regan was cleared of charges. The episode recharged CWS and its membership base. Tony Blair's Co-operative Commission, chaired by John Monks, made major recommendations for the co-operative movement, including the organisation and marketing of the retail societies. It was in this climate that, in 2000, CWS merged with the UK's second largest society, Co-operative Retail Services.

Its headquarter complex is situated on the north side of Manchester city centre adjacent to the Manchester Victoria railway station. The complex is made up of many different buildings with two notable tower blocks of New Century House and the solar panel-clad CIS tower.

Other independent societies are part owners of the Group. Representatives of the societies that part own the Group are elected to the Group's national board. The Group manages The Co-operative brand and the Co-operative Retail Trading Group (CRTG), which sources and promotes goods for food stores. There is a similar purchasing group (CTTG) for co-operative travel agents.

Kalabagh Dam, An Acute Contradictory Issue of Pakistan - 1

Historical Overview of This issue

The controversy of Kalabagh Dam (KBD) has raged between the four provinces of Pakistan since 1984 when its project report left the drawing boards of WAPDA and was circulated among the provinces. Since then much has been said and written on the subject by many knowledgeable people from different walks of life covering economic, technical and environmental aspects of the project. Politicians have also jumped into the fray using strong words for and against the dam.

When one looks at the arguments, and the people who have advanced them, it immediately becomes evident that every politician, technocrat and common man from Punjab favours the dam while almost all people from the other three provinces oppose it. It is as if the sharp line of division between the pro and anti dam lobbies has also become a fault line between Punjab on the one hand and the remaining provinces of Pakistan, on the other.

Very strong words have been used by both sides. In the not so distant past, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the then federal minister for Water and Power had repeatedly thundered that the Kalabagh Dam would be constructed “at all costs”. He clearly meant to say that the Kalabagh Dam will be constructed whether other provinces objected (and suffered) or not. Most technocrats and formers of public opinion from Punjab also kept expressing their unqualified view that the Kalabagh dam was the “life and death of the country”.

Equally strong words have been issued by prominent people opposing the project. The NWFP leader Begum Naseem Wali Khan has gone so far as to call the Dam a “threat to the sovereignty” of the country. This, besides the fact that the provincial Assembly of NWFP has passed resolutions no less than four times against the construction of Kalabagh Dam.

Sind, which contends that there is not enough water left in River Indus to tap from, and which as lower riparian, will suffer the most from the till effects fo damming the river and from further loss of water that is proposed to be taken KBD, has also protested the most. The provincial Assembly which is the highest forum of expression of the political will of the province, has twice passed a resolution against the dam. The government of Sindh, through the experts of its Irrigation and Planning & Development departments and through D.O letters from its Chief Ministers, has also constantly, and vehemently, opposed the project due to this detrimental effects on Sindh. The details of relevant correspondence is given elsewhere in the book.

And as far as the people’s will is concerned, one would be hard pressed to find even one person in the length and breadth of Sindh who has a kinds word for the project and is not opposed to the dam in the strongest possible sense. Political parties that are a manifestation of public opinion, have come out clearly and unequivocally against construction of kalabagh dam. Following are the names of those parties and groups that have declared their opposition and resentment against the Kalabagh project.

Peoples Party (Passed a Resolution against KBD in the Sindh Provincial Assembly).
Sindh Democratic Party
Sindh National Front Led by Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto
Awami Tehrik Led by Rasool Bux Palijo
Sindh Tarqi Pasand Party Led by Dr Qadir Magsi
Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz Led by Mr Abdul Wahid Areesar
Jeay Sindh Mahaz Led by Mr A.Khaliq Junejo
Sindh Sagar Party
Jamiat Ulmai Sindh
Jamiat Ulmai Pakistan (Sindh Branch)

It must be understood by those who favour the dam, that the people of sindh have a very special relationship with river Indus. In Sindh river Indus is omnipresent. It has life. It loves and hates scattered across the plains of Sindh there are remains of innumerable settlements, (including no less than 19 large cities that were at one time or the other capitals of Sindh) that have turned into mounts. Much like Moen-jo-Daro, indicating at once, the benefaction and the destruction caused by the great river which first gave life to these settlements and then took it away by changing its course to either drown or parch the cities to extinction.

The overwhelming presence of the river is evident in the day to day life of sindh. One hears about “Sindhu Nadi” or “Daryah” in casual conversation, one continuously reads or hears about it in the rpose or petry of Sindhi literature, once can’t travel by rail or road much before encountering the river. Above all else so many business houses and innumerable childerren are named after the river (e.g. Indus, Sindhu, Mehran, Darya etc.) showing the extent to which the lives of Sindhi people are intertwined with the great river.

Further, it must be understood that the awe and the affections in which sindhi people hold river Indus is not due to sentimentality alone but because of the tremendous economic significance of the great river that directly or indirectly touches almost every soul on the soil of sindh.

It must be remembered that river Indus is the only source of water, either for drinking or for irrigation, available to the people of Sindh. Unlike Punjab which gets a sizeable rain in the monsoon, Sindh is a parched land getting less than an average of five inches of rain (127mm) per year. Again, unlike Punjab that has a large reservoir of sweet water under its soil from which 350,000 tube wells draw as much as 40 MAF water every year, the subsoil water of most of Sindh is as saltish as sea water. This makes river Indus the only source of life in Sindh. Remove Indus, or dry it out. And the difference between existence and extinction starts narrowing fast.

It is precisely for this reason that the forlorn and helpless form of the great river in the shape of a dry bed of swirling sand give rise to so much antipathy against yet another project of damming the river, this time at kalabagh, from which as much as 12.78 MAF water will be syphoned off.

All assurances advanced by the Government of Pakistan and WAPDA that Sindh will be given the required water for irrigation as well as for releasing below Kotri (into the sea), do not find credibility in Sindh because of a number of disturbing indicators.

The statements from responsible official of the federal government, the Punjab government and WAPDA, at first declared Kalabagh Dam as only a storage dam to offset the loss of storage of Tarbela and Mangla, due to siltation. Next came the statements that due to rise in fuel costs and consequent cost of thermal electric generation, cheap hydel power was essential. Much later was learnt that there were plans for a left and right bank canal for irrigation also.

Combined with above, the secretive and surreptitious moves to make Sindh government somehow agree to Kalabagh Dam (mostly through its weak and pliable Chief Ministers), raise grave doubts in the minds of the people of Sindh.

Chashma-Jhelum link canal iis another indicator of doubtful intentions. The 21,000 cusecs canal linking Chasma Barrage with Jehlum river supposed to open only when there was surplus water in Indus and that too with the express permission of the Chief minister of Sindh. (details along with official correspondence are given in the relevant chapter of the book). Now the Chashma-Jhelum link is open all the time even when there is shortage in River Indus, as in the case of kharif 1997.

The World Bank had agreed in 1992 to grant US $ 800,000 for a comprehensive stud of the effects of the reduced water flow down stream of kotri, on the estuaries of Indus. It would have helped compute the advantages of Kalabagh Dam to Punjab against the social, economic and environmental cost to sindh, in case the quantum of water released below Kotri was reduced. This study was shelved because the officials of Punjab did not agree to the Terns of Reference (TOR) of the study. With such examples in front of them the people of sindh are extremely, and rightly, suspicious off all the moves to construct Kalabagh Dam.

Above all else, the constant refusal of Punjab and WAPDA to consider intiation and construction of the much superior Basha Dam raises the fears of Sind to alarming proportions relevant details appear elsewhere in the book. Explained in short, basha dam is also situated on river Indus, has almost equal capacity (5.7 MAF against KBD’s 6.1 MAF) and can generate far more hydel power than KBD. What makes Basha superior is that it can truly be a carry over dam that can store water in the years of plenty for subsequent use of more than one year and, in any case, keep Tarbela Dam Filled for 2 to 4 months more than at present.

Despite Sindh’s severe objections to damming any of the rivers of Indus River System, it can still be persuaded to the construction of Basha Dam if it is agreed that the dam will be filled only in the super flood years and in the lean years it will be allowed to operate as a run of the river hydel power generating dam like Ghazi Barotha.

But such an arrangement will not be acceptable to Punjab (and therefore WAPDA), because it is physically impossible to dteal water from Basha reservoir to irrigate lands in Punjab. Or so the people of Sindh suspect.

Keeping the above facts in perspective and sensing the mood of the people of Sindh, its government and its parliament, sindh democratic party took it upon itself to delve into and research the subject of Kalabagh Dam (or any other mega storage dam on River Indus) and to present the point of view of the lower riparian.

The arty entrusted the work to its secretary General, Mr. Abrar Kazi, who has taken great pains to study, research and present “The Sindh Case”.

Not unmindful of Pakistan’s need for more agricultural produced to feed the ever increasing population, and the country’s need for cheap hydel power, Sindh Democratic Party has presented viable alternates to both aspects of the dilemma.

The dispute over the water of a river flowing through more than one country or more than one province of the same country is not new. In the bygone days of history such disputes never assumed seriousness because water resources available were far greater than the need of the consumers. It is only in recent times, to be more specific, since the beginning of 20th century, that water disptes between states and between provinces became sufficiently acute to warrant serious mediation.

For example dispute of sharing waters of the Nile between Uganda and Egypt was adjudicated by the Nile Commission in 1926 while the Permanent Court of International Justice decided the case of sharing of water of the Muese between Belgium and Netherlands on 28th June 1937.

Even in the subcontinent there was sufficient disagreement between the provinces to warrant the enactment of Northern Indian Canal and Drainage Act, 1873.

Disputes of apportionment of water between different states of the United states of America have been adjudicated upon at very great length by the US supreme court. Some of the celebrated cases are as follows:

KANSAS V COLORADO (1927) (206 US 46)
WYOMING V COLORADO (1922) (259 US 419)
CONNECTICUT V MASSACHUSETTS (1931) (282 US 660)
NEW JERSY V NEW YORK (1931) (823 US 336)
ARIZONA V CALIFORNIA (1931) (283 US 423)
WASHINGTON V OREGON (1936) (297 US 517)

These and many more have left well defined parameters of law, the help of which can be sought by the people of Pakistan to understand the experience of other nations and peoples where water disputes have soured relations.

From the experience of others, at least three major principles of international law can be gleaned.

The first point of law worth mentioning is derived from the british common law. Also applicable to the sub- subcontinent, the law says that, “ A riparian owner or occupier has an unrestricted right to take and use the water of a stream for ordinary domestic purposes such as drinking, washing, and for wants of his cattle”.

Ref: Embrey V Own (1851) 6 EX 353

Swindon Water Work co V. Willts and Berks Canal Navigation Co (1875) LEHC 697

Mc Cartney V Londonderry and Lough Swilly Ry Co (1904) A.C. 301.

The second point to consider is that “As between different appropriations from the same stream, the one first in times is deemed superior in right and a completed appropriation was regarded as effective from the time the purpose to make ti was definitely formed and actual work thereon was begun, provided the work was carried to completion with reasonable diligence’.

The third point to remember emanates from the government of India Act 1935 Section 130 and Section 131(6), that inter-alia recognizes the principle that no province can e given an entirely free hand in respect of a common source of water such as inter-provincial river.

The point is further explained in Prof. H.A.Smith’s “Economic Use of International Rivers” (1931) which examines treaties between independent state since 1785 and states that all these treaties proceed upon the principle that works executed in the territory of one state required the consent of another, if they injuriously affect the interests of the latter.

Examining the riparian rights, the RAO Commission opines in the “the report of Indus commission” (Para 49, page 33), “Pushed to its logical conclusion, this means that a province in which the head waters of a great river are situated can abstract any quantity of water and make a desert of the provinces or states lower down. We have already pointed out that this view is against the trend of international law and that in any event, so far as India is concerned, it would conflict with the manifest intention of section 130 and the succeeding sections of the government of India act 1935”.

The RAO commission and almost all international treaties suggest “equitable apportionments” based on the consent of riparian.

The words “Consent of riparian states” are very important especially so for Pakistan which is a federation of four provinces. If contentious issues, like the waters of a common river, are not resolved through “Consent and consensus”. And a perception develops in one federating unit that other units are taking advantage of it because of its weakness (geographical, numerical or economic) a lasting harm could be caused to the unity of the federation. More so when the emotions run so strong as in the case of Kalabagh Dam.

A further reason to be careful and more sensitive to the feelings of the people (in this case the people of sindh) is the long history of water dispute between sindh and Punjab. Till date no less than six commissions have sat to decide the water issue namely:

1. Anderson Committee 1935

2. Rao Commission 1941

3. Akhtar Hussain Commmittee 1968

4. Fazle Akbar Commission 1970

5. Anwar ul Haq Commission 1981

6. Haleem Commission 1983

Among all these commissions, recommendations of only the RAO Commission of 1941 were able to find acceptance with both the provincial governments of Punjab and sindh. All other commissions suffered from various shortcomings including severe disagreement between the members of the commissions.

Justice Fazle Akber was so exasperated that he recorded the following note:-

it is regrettable that the members of the committee failed to work out any recommendations for the apportionment of the water of the Indus and its tributaries among the four provinces in West Pakistan. Unfortunately the lack of agreement was not restricted only to the question of apportionment; even on purely technical issues the members had generally failed to agree amongst themselves. I, therefore, had no other alternate but to formulate my own recommendations fro the consideration of the president.

Our law makers had all these experiences before them and they were fully conscious of the need of developing consensus between the federating unites regarding “equitable water apportionment”. They created Indus River System Authority (IRSA) through an Act of Parliament in 1992 to oversee the distribution and monitoring of the common waters of Indus River System.

IRSA which has one member from each province and its chairmanship rotates n alphabetic order of the names of the provinces, has in its recent meeting of 30.12.1996 pointed to the deficiencies in the design and site location of kalabagh dam by three of its members, from Sindh, NWFP and balochistan.

( Decision of IRSA along with accompanying letter Appendix – I )

It should be noted that all decisions of IRSA must be unanimous, otherwise the aggrieved province can take it case to the council of common interests (C.C.I) which has all Chief Ministers of the four federating unit as members.

So much is the emphasis on the provinces unanimously agreeing to the formula of equitable apportionment of water that if the C.C.I can not decide a matter with consensus, a sitting of the joint session of parliament will decide the issue.

But the matter does not end here. Any federating unit or even a common man of any province. If, it/he feels that the joint session of the parliament has not done justice and has ram rolled the decision to the detriment of a federating unit, can move higher courts to stop execution of the decision.

Seen in this backdrop, and the grave reservations that the provinces of Sindh and NWFP have about kalabagh dam, the project should not be ushed so hard by WAPDA and the province of Punjab. If it is considered that a do or die situation has arrived for Pakistan vis-a-vis the dam (which in the presence of alternate dam sites is hard to imagine), then the differing provinces should be so convinced.

Sindh Democratic Party, as this research work will indicate, thinks otherwise. It considers, as it has argued in this book, that the benefit of the project does not justify the social, economic, and environmental cost, especially to Sindh, and that the huge outlay of about Rs. 450 billion (US $ 10 billion) should be spent on carryover dams upstream of Tarbela and on water management projects that will save much more water than the 6.1 MAF stored by Kalabagh dam, simultaneously reducing the devastating effects of salinity and water logging now being experienced in the Indus plains.

A word of caution for WAPDA. WAPDA is a federal organization that is sustained by funds contributed by all federating units. It should not act in a partisan way advocating the point of view of only one province when all the provinces will pay for its wrong decisions or mistakes. Let the people of all the provinces make the decisions that will affect their lives through the legal and laid down procedures.

Same word of caution must be repeated for the international financing agencies that are interested in undertaking financial arrangements of kalabagh dam. Pakistan is a federation and if a costly project like kalabagh dam is forced down the throats of smaller provinces against international law and justice, the aggrieved provinces have every right to refuse to repay the loans obtained.

I would take this opportunity to appeal to all the intellectuals, human rights groups and all agencies interested in the protection of the environment, inside and outside pakisatn, to study the problem of kalabagh dam and , if they agree with the view of Sindh Democratic Party, to forcefully raise their collective voices against constructions of the dam.

I will also take this opportunity to appeal to my brothers in the siraiki belt that sindh and sindhis will always favour Sirais, especially in their development of agriculture, of for that matter the development of agriculture in punjab. What sindh demands is that its apprehensions should be understood. If viable and superior alternatives are available, as amply indicated in this document, then our sirai, and I must say, Punjabi, brothers should help us avert the extremely harmful kalabagh dam.

In the end I will also like to express sindh Democratic Party’s deep appreciation and gratitude for all those who have contributed in making “The Sindh Case” possible. Without their help, from contributing in the shape of research material and books, to operating computer keyboard and proof reading, our effort at producing an all-encompassing documents would have fallen way short of expectations.

Date: 08-01-1998 Muhammad Yousuf Laghari

Chairman Sindh Democratic Party

01 02 03 04 05 06 07

Notes Pakistan Study Water Resources

Kalabagh Dam, An Acute Contradictory Issue of Pakistan - 2

INDUS RIVER SYSTEM

The majestic River Indus, Originates at 16,000 ft. (5183) above sea level in the glaciers of the northern slopes of Kailash Parbat in Tibet. Starting as a trickle it collects rain water and melting snow from a catchment area of 360,000 Sq. miles (940,000 Sq. km) to become one of the mightiest Rivers of the world, ten times bigger than the Colorado River and twice as large as the Nile.

On its long voyage of 2000 miles (3000 km) it is augmented by ten major rivers: Kabul, Swat, Kohat, Haro and Soan in the Northern Frontier Province and Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas in Punjab. The ferocious river, more than a million cusecs (cubic feet per second) at its peak flood time, then passes through 400 miles (600 km) of the plains of Sindh to drain into the salt waters of Arabian Sea.

The Muddy water of River Indus and its tributaries have eons inundated the plains of Punjab and Sindh carrying about 400 million tones of silt per year that have, on the one hand, enriched the plains of Indus basin and, on the other, supported an enormously variegated and kaleidoscopical life in its path and its deltaic estuaries. Remains of so many human settlements scattered all over Punjab and sindh bear testimony to the generous endowment of Indus.

It is said that in the Jurassic period ( 160 million years ago ) Indus valley only existed up to present day Multan and drained into an ocean named Tethyes Sea.

The million tons of silt river Indus carries per day, claimed about 60 ft of land every year from the sea. From the times of the Mesozoic era and throughout the Cenozoic era (70 million years downward) as the bed of the river rose due to sedimentation and the river kept changing its course, at least seven times in the recorded history, whole of sindh was claimed from sea. Perhaps this theory needs to be more closely examined, but the presence of marsh lands in the middle of the desert, Rann of Kutch, where Indus river drained into the sea ages ago and the fact that in overwhelming cases subsoil water reservoirs in Sindh are as saltish as sea water, while whole of NWFP, and most of Punjab has sweet water, is hard evidence giving credence to the hypothesis.

While passing through Frontier and Punjab, the tributaries of Indus criss-cross the entire length and breadth of the provinces before draining into Indus. But when passing through Sindh and literally bisecting it, the great river enters as an enormous body water that submerges a swath of zigzagging land 600 miles ( 1000 km ) long and at an average 5 miles ( 8 km ) wide before cascading into the Arabian Sea.

This strip of land totaling 1.9 million acres (760,000 hectares) and known as katcho in Sindh, husbands 598,800 ( 240,000 hectares ) of riverine forests and 1,000,000 acres ( 400,000 hectares ) or rich grazing land.

Further down, covering the entire deltaic region, Indus has given birth to 650,000 acres ( 260,000 hectares ) of a thick mangrove forest, sixth largest in the world, that abounds in colourful marine and botanical life.

The quantity of water flowing in the Indus river and its tributaries varies very gently depending upon the quantum of snow and rain water in the catchment areas.

The recorded quantity is a minimum of 100 MAF (million acre feet) in the year 1974 – 75 corresponding to approximately 140,000 cusecs (cubic-feet per second ) of water flowing all year round, to more than 186 MAF in the year 1959 – 60.

Since the British conquest of Sindh (1843) and Punjab (1847) there have been continuous efforts at harassing the waters of Indus river system to irrigate the plain of sindh and Punjab.

Up till now 2 storage dams, 19 barrages, 43 canal subsystems including 11 major link canals have been built on river Indus and its tributaries to create the world’s largest contiguous man made irrigation network comprising of 40,000 miles (64,000 km) of canals, distributaries and minors.

The enormous irrigation system commands 34.5 million acres of land out of which 29.5 million acres ( 11,7 million Ha, 1988-89 data ) are canal irrigated using 105,000 water courses. The vast acreage under cultivation is spread under three million individual farms and consumes about 105 MAF water per year from the Indus river system.

The Majestic River Chained

Previous to British rule, irrigation in Indus Basin was dependent upon inundation canals like east and west Nara canal in upper Sindh and Phulleli and Pinyari in Hyderabad. The first man made canal was perhaps dug in 1639 by Ali Mardan Khan primarily to bring water from Ravi to Shalimar Gardens but its water was also used to irrigate some land around Lahore.

In Sindh the rulers of Kalhora Dynasty ( 1701 AD – 1783 AD ) were great canal builders and agriculturists. They built 10 mile long. Nurwah branching from the then inundation canal Begari; 2 mile long Shah-Ji-Kur and 20 mile long Date-Ji-Kur which are now absorbed in Warah canal. They also built Nusrat Wah, Murad Wah and Bag and Feroza Branches in central Sindh that have been absorbed by the present Rohri canal.

However The British visualized the tremendous potential of harnessing waters of River Indus and its tributaries into producing grain for the whole of India and cotton for the textile industries of Manchester. Therefore immediately after the conquest of Punjab in 1847, work on Central Bari Doab canal from Ravi was started ( 1859 ).

The success of Central Bari Doab canal was followed by Sidhnai canal, lower Chenab and Lower Jehlum Canals ( 1885 – 1901 ); Paharpur Canal ( 1908 ), Upper Swat canal (1914 ) and triple canal project (Upper Jehlum, Upper Chenab, lower Bari Doab ) in 1915.

With the completion of the ambitious Sutlej Valley Project in 1932, comprising of 11 canals and 4 head works, much of Punjab was brought under canal irrigated agriculture.

In the same year (1932) Sukkar Barrage was completed on River Indus opening up the plains of Sindh for extensive canal irrigation. Trimmu head work on Chenab was completed in 1939 followed by Kalabagh (or Jinnah) Barrage on river Indus. Three more barraged were commissioned on Indus after the partition. Kotri Barrage was built in 1955 closely followed by Taunsa in 1958 and Guddu in 1962.

With the commissioning of so many barrages and canals, substantial quantity of water was removed from Indus River System in order to meet the irrigation needs of the growing population of the country.

A massive depletion of water resources of Indus River System then occurred under the provision of Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan when a colossal mass of 33 MAF water was abruptly removed by surrendering three Punjab river to India.

(To understand how much water 33 MAF is, it should be noted that the huge perennial canals like Rohri canal and Phulleli, when they flow all year round, take about 3 MAF each).

Signed in September 1960, some articles of the treaty are as under:

Articles:

II (1) All the waters of the Eastern Rivers (defined as the stulej, Beas and Ravi)

shall be available for unrestricted use of India.

(2) Except for domestic use and non-consumptive use, Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit an interference with, the waters of Sutlej Main and Ravi Main in the reaches where those rivers flow in Pakistan and have not yet finally crossed into Pakistan.

III (1) Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers (defined as the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) which india is under

obligation to let flow.

Thus Indus River System lost water of its tree eastern rivers in place of a loan to construct 2 storage dams, 5 barrages, one gated siphon and 8 link canals to divert some of the water of western rivers into the now dry eastern rivers, under the Treaty.

As per agreement Pakistan built the following 2 dams:

(i) Mangla Dam was built on Jhelum in 1967 to store 5.3 MAF.

(ii) Tarbela was also built on Indus in 1974 to store 9.3 MAF.

The loss of three eastern rivers and their 33 MAF; the two dams storing 14.6 MAF and the 19 barrages and head works taking 105 MAF of water per year have completed the process of chaining the once mighty Indus that used to flow into the Arabian Ocean, not so long ago.

Today, in most years, River Indus is a trickle of water in an otherwise dry bed of swirling sand. Only in some years, when is an extra ordinary rainfall in the catchment areas, does the flow of water become sufficient to be called a flood.

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Notes Pakistan Studies Water Resources

Kalabagh Dam, An Acute Contradictory Issue of Pakistan - 3

KALABAGH DAM

Despite severe depletion of water resources of Indus River System, Pakistan’s most populous and most powerful province Punjab and WAPDA ( Water and Power Development Authority ), are insistent that they want to build yet another mega storage dam on River Indus at Kalabagh with the purpose of draining another 12.86 MAF water for irrigation.

The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) is proposed to be located at about 120 miles (200 km) downstream of Tarbela dam. According to PC – II, stage III Proferma, when constructed.

Quote “ it is expected to be 260 ft high and would create a reservoir of 6.1 million acre feet (MAF) of usable storage. The annual production of energy would amount to about 11,200GWh (Giga Watt Hours) generated by a hydro power plant of 2,400 MW capacity. This capacity may ultimately be increased to 3,600 MW making Kalabagh one of the largest single hydrogenation of dams in Asia. The total project cost covering civil and power facilities as estimated by the consultants at June 1987 prices will be about US $ 5.153 billion including interest during construction, customs duties and taxes and price contingencies” – unquote.

(Dam Particulars Appendix – 3)

(Site Plan Appendix – 4)

The objectives of the project given in Pc – II, Stage – 3 are as under:

The proposed Kalabagh Dam is multipurpose. Its main objectives are:

(1) To generate large amounts of low cost hydro electric power near major load centres, and supply the existing grid for meeting the growing power demand of agriculture, industrial and domestic consumers. In addition to increase the energy output of the existing Tarbela scheme by permitting the conjunctive operation of the two reservoirs.

(2) To provide additional storage on the Indus and thus reduce the existing system shortfall in irrigation requirements.

(3) To provide additional regulation on the Indus River the biggest source of surface water in Pakistan, and thus provide better system control and management for supplying assured, adequate and timely irrigation water for crops.

(4) To compensate for the storage loss due to the silting up of existing reservoirs till such time that their substitutes, presently being planned, are actually available.

(5) To eliminate and control flood peaks of the Indus to minimize flood hazards downstream.

(6) To increase Pakistan’s capability to manage its water distribution and power generation systems through the conjunctive operation of Tarbela and Kalabagh Reservoirs.

According to the same PC - II:

Field Studies for the Kalabagh Dam Project were initiated by the Government of Pakistan in 1953. Until 1973, the project was basically considered as a storage project for meeting irrigation needs. However, the oil crises of 1973 and the consequent rapid increases in the cost of energy have greatly enhanced the priority of Kalabagh as a power project.

After engaging many consultants and field studies, spread over more than 3 decades, Stage I covering detailed investigation and preparation of the project planning report commenced in March’ 84 establishing the technical & economic feasibility of the project. Stage II covering preparation of detailed designs and tender documents for civil work including the preparation of documents commenced in March’ 84 and was completed by December ’85.

So far studies on feasibility and documentation have cost the Government of Pakistan Rs.1 Billion.

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Notes Pakistan Studies Water Resources

Kalabagh Dam, An Acute Contradictory Issue of Pakistan - 4

The Dispute

The dispute on Kalabagh Dam has raged between the four provinces of Pakistan since 1984 when the proposal left the drawing boards of WAPDA and surfaced for the public to see and debate. Punjab, where the Dam is located favours the project for the professed reason that the country needs electric power and the Kalabagh Dam will provide 3,600 MW of the energy. An additionally reason cited is the urgent need to store more water to compensate for the strage capacity being lost due to the fast silting up of the Tarbela and MAngla dams. What is not always declared however, and has only been drudgingly released for public knowledge, is the Punjab wishes to irrigate 380,000 acres of land (146,000 ha) on both banks of Mianwali, Khushad &Jhelum districts through a canal off taking from the left Bank High Level Outlet Works of KBD that will draw 15,000 cusecs of water from the KBD reservoir. The same canal will also meet water shortages in the Mangla command area before discharging into the Jhelum River upstream of Rasul Barrage. Yet another 15,000 cusecs canal is proposed to be tapped from the Right Bank of the dam that will irrigate 2.12 million acres in the Kurram Basin of D.I.Khan.

NWFO objects to the dam primarily because of a sizeable number of its people will be displaced, and vast area of its lands and services will be submerged under the reservoir. River Indus does not touch the province of Balochistan therefore it is not directly affected, but its still objects that its share of water, already very low, will be further reduced. However it is the province of Sindh which as lower riparian has constantly felt threatened by Punjab and has bitterly disputed the figures of water availability advanced by Punjab and WAPDA citing legal, economic, ecological, geomorphological, and many other reason for opposing Kalabagh Dam.

So acute have been the differences between Punjab and Sindh over the sharing of the water of Indus river system that no less than 6 commissions have deliberated up on an equitable appropriation of the waters between both provinces :-

1. Anderson Commission 1935

2. The Indus Commision (Also Known As Rao Commission) 1941

3. Akhter Hussain Committee 1968

4. Indus Waters Committee (Also known as Fazle Akber Committee1970

5. Anwarul Haq Commission (Aborted) 1981

6. Haleem Commission 1983

And with the notable exception of Rao Commission of 1941, so wide has been the difference in the perception of both provinces about their rightful share of water and so acrimonious the debate, that Justice Fazle Akber was constrained to write “ it is regrettable that the members of the committee failed to work out any recommendations for the apportionment of the waters of the Indus and its tributaries among the four provinces in West Pakistan. Unfortunately the lack of agreement was not restricted only to the question of apportionment; even on purely technical issues the members had generally failed to agree amongst themselves. I therefore had no other alternate but to formulate my own recommendations for the President”.(13)

The bitterness continues till date as Justice Fazle Akber had written, not over the apportionment of water alone but right down to technical matters. Kalabagh Dam is only one unresolved water related issue among many. For example The technical committee on Water Resources (TCWR) set up by General Musharraf that submitted its report in Aug 2005 and had eight members, two from each province, beside the chairman, MIR ANG Abassi (14), could not agree on almost all issues. The TCWR had the advantage of the presentations and bast data available with wapda, IRSA (Indus River System Authority), the Ministries of water and Power and of planning Department but even it could not agree on as simple a technical matter as the guantum of water available in the system. The seven members, two each from Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan and a non-Sindhi member from Sindh had one opinion, the other member from Sindh the second, Wapda is Augures individual the 3rd opinion and the Chairman had the fourth opinion.

Before 1859 when the first man made canal, upper Bari Doab, was drawn from Ravi by the British, cultivation on Indus Basin was only possible through lifting water from inundation canals (for example east and west Nara, Phulleli) and from subsoil reservoir and a few miles of primitives canals made by previous rulers. Surface water irrigation was possible only in the case of rain fed (Barani) lands and those areas around rivers that were left moist, like Katcho, due to overflowing rivers in summer season. Out of the two sowing season abundant water was available for Kharif (sowing April, May) while in Rabi (sowing November, December) there was always shortage due to sources of water freezing in Himalayas.

Realising the scope of mischief the subject of water could play between various provinces of India, the British set up India Irrigation Commission (1901 - 1903) that, among other things ordered Punjab to obtain assent of Sindh before undertaking projects concerning water of the Indus River System. The Government of India Act 1919 made it mandatory that all disputes of water between Sindh and Punjab provinces be decided by the Viceroy of India.

A “Cotton Committee” was set up in 1919 and it reported the same year that Punjab should not be allocated water from Indus till the effects of construction of the proposed Sukker Barrage had not become evident.

In September 1919 government of Punjab presented Thal project as against Sukker Barrage project which was rejected outright by the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford.

The Sukker Barrage project was conceived by Chief Engineer Sindh, Mr. A.A.Musto and the project was approved by The government of India in July 1923. The barrage was commissioned nine years later in July 1932.

But immediately after the work had started on Sukker Barrage, Punjab in Sept 1925 once again presented its Thal project to government of India. Once again it was rejected, this time by Viceroy Lord Reading, who cited grievous injustice to the interests of the lower riparian as reason for rejection of that project.

The water dispute between Sindh and Punjab had b this time reached such proportion that government of India was forced to constitute an eight member committee, under Chief Engineer of UP, Mr. Anderson. The report of Anderson Committee was presented to the government of India on 16th Sept 1935 which accepted all its recommendations in a letter issued on 30th March 1937.

The terms of reference of Anderson Committee were:

1. The extent to which additional supplies of water are actually required for (a) the Khaipur State; (b) The Bahawalpur State; (c) the Haveli Project.

2. The possibility of finding such supplies without detriment to the parties interested in the waters of the Indus and its tributaries and the effect upon the existing or prospective rights of those parties of any fresh withdrawals, the authorization of which the committee may recommend.

The Sindh government did not agree with the recommendations of Anderson Committee and again took its case to the Government of India, which on 11th September 1941 set up another commission under MR. B.N.Rao, Judge of Culcutta High Court, with instructions to find a lasting solution for the continuing water dispute between the two provinces. The commission studied the complaints of Sindh and the rebuttals of Punjab and came out with an exhaustive “Report of the Indus Commission” which became the basis of deliberations between the Governments of Sindh and Punjab.

1. The extent to which additional supplies of water are actually required for (a) the khairpur State: (b) the Bahawalpur State: (c) the Haveli Project.

2. The possibility of finding such supplies without detriment to the parties interested in the waters of the Indus and its tributaries and the effect upon the existing or prospective rights of those parties of any fressh withrawals, the authorization of which the committee may recommend.

The Sindh Government did not agree with the recommendations of Anderson Committee and again took its case to the Government of India, which on 11 th Septermbe 1941 set up another commissin under Mr. B.N.Rao, Judge of Calcutta High Court, with instruction to find a lasting solution for the continuing water dispute between the two provinces. The commission studied the complaints of Sindh and the rebuttals of Punjab and came out with an exhaustive “Report of the Indus Commision” which became the basis of deliberation between the Governments of Sindh and Punjab.

The rerms of reference of the Rao Commission are as under:

COMPLAINT OF SINDH AND PROJECTS COMPLAINED OF: This is a complaint by the Government of Sindh under section 130 of the Government of India Act 1935. The complaint relates to certain irrigation projects constructed or contemplated by the Government of the Punjab on the Indus and its tributaries. These projects, as set out in paragraphs 3, 4 and 28 of Sindh,s printed complaint, part-I, are:

1. The Haveli project -------------------- already in operation:

2. The Thal project -------------------- under construction:

3. The Bhakra Dam project ----------- in contermplation:

4. 24 storage reservioirs with an assumed capacity of 500,000 acres-feet (1 acre-foot= 43,560 cubic feet) each, on the effluents of the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas: and

5. Feeders to transfer water (subject to certain conditions) from the Ravi to the Beas and from the Chenab to the Beas with a total assumed withdrawal of 23,000 cusects (1 cusec= 1 cubic foot per second or about 2 cre-feet per day) at its highest-said to be in conteplation (15)

Relying heavily on international law, especially American law, which had experienced many inter-state disputes of water, the Rao Commission based its recommendation on three principles:

1. No province/state can be given and entirely free hand in respect of a common source of water such as an inter provincial/state river.

2. Works executed in the territory of one province/state require the consent of another, if they injuriously affect the interests of the latter.

3. In a dispute of appropriation of water from the same stream, the one first in time is superior in right

The deliberation between the Governments of Sindh and Punjab started in April 1943 and concluded in a Draft Agreement on 28th September, 1945. Known as Sindh-Punjab Agreement 1945, signed by Chief Engineers of both provinces on behalf of their respective governments, the Draft Agreement settled the thorny issue of apportionment of water of Indus and its tributaries, laying down the broad principles of settling disputes that were vven likely to arise in future.

In a letter to the Government of Sindh, Government of Punjab, through its secretary (public Works, Lrrigation Branch) accepted the Draft Agreement. Its only objection was on the amount o Rs 20 million that the Rao Commission had recommended Punjab to pay to Sindh against the cost of 120 million for building 2 barrages in Sindh (16)

Unfortunately, the political events in the subcontinent overtook all other busincess of governance soon after, and the Sindh Punjab agreement was never ratified by the two provincial legislatures. Howvever it remains the only agreement ever that was agreed upon by the governments of Sindh and Punjab and for this reason the recommendations of Rao Commission continue to be considered credible till date and have been acted upon till as late as 1990. (17)

A complex and very harmful dimensin was added to the water dispute betwenn Sindh and Punjab when water of 3 rivers, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, was lost to India.

Sir Simon Radcliff, after he drew the faterful red line separating pakistan from India, formed a Division of Assets Committee, also known as committee B, that consisted of officials from each government department, one from either side, to oversee the difficulties arising out of the Partition. An Arbitral Tribunal headed by the chief justice of India was also set up to adjusticate on matters that could not be resdved in the Division of Assets Committee.

The life of both committees was fixed till 31st March 1948 by which time ti was expected that complication arising out of the division of assets and liabilities of each government department would be over.

The West Punjab secretary of irrigation S.I.Mehboob was nominated on Committee B. Since Ferozepur Head Works on river Sutlej was to be in India and tis Dipalpur canal as flowing through pakistan and similarly, since Madhupur Head Works was to remain in India while Central Bari Doab canal flowing from it was crossing over into pakistan and both canals could easily be closed, S.I.Mehboob succeeded in getting the tricky matter fixed on the agenda of Committee B.

When the matter was fixed for discussion by the committee, government of pakistan committed a grave mistake by nominating khan bahadur shaikh abdul Hameed, onother secretary irrigation form Punjab, in place of S.I.Mehboob.

Incredibly Mr.Kanwar Sen the Indian nominee persuaded K.B Sheikh abdul Hameed to withdraw the apportionment of water from the agenda of Committee B altogether!!

It is asaid that Kanwar Sen was an old colleague of K.B. Sheikh Abdul Hameed in combined India and played upon the intensive rivalry between Hameed and S.I.Mehboob (18)

India allowed both canals to flow to the brim till exactly 31st March 1948 when the life of Committee B and the Arbitral Tribunal ended. On 1st April 1948 both canals were effectively closed and all hell broke loose in Punjab.

Ghulam Mohammed the finance minister of Pakistan accompanied by Mumtaz Daultana and Shoukat Hayat Khan and a few officials from West Punjab rushed to Dehli to plead with Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the Indian premier. Mr.Nehru informed the harried delegates that by removing the apportionment of water from the agenda of committee B, Pakistan had in principle accepted Indian right over the of water of Sutlej and Ravi. He demanded monetary compensation to allow the now Indian waters to flow into Pakistan.

Pakistan Government committed the 2nd, and immensely bigger, mistake of allowing its delegates to sign the agreement in on 4th May 1948 in Delhi, as mentioned by Choudhry Mohammed Ali in which they agreed to pay compensation, or seigniorage charges, to India.

Choudhry Mohammad Ali in his book, The Emergence of Pakistan (19) narrates this episode as under:-

“Despite the fact that the Radcliffe Award had placed the control of headworks vital for pakistan in the hands of India, the West Punjab government remained content because of the agreement reached by Committee B and the Punjab Partition Committee, that the prepartition shares of water would not be varied. No formal document specifying the precise shares of East Punjab and West punjab in irrigation waters was drawn up and signed. The West punjab ministers and officials felt assured by the repeated declarations of their counterparts in East Punjab that there was no question of any change in the prepartition arrangements for canal waters. The same declaration were also made by the East Punjab respresentatives beiore the Arbitral Tribunal, when the sisputed question of the valuation of the canal system came up for a hearing. Actually, as events showed, the East punjab ministers and officials were planning a deadly blow against pakistan and were lulling the West punjab government to sleep with swee\et words. They were waiting for the day when the life of the Arbitral Tribunal would come to an end on March 31, 1948. On the side of East Punjab there was Machiavellian duplicity. On the part of West Punjab there was neglect of duty, complacency, and lack of common prudence --- which had disastrous consequences for pakistan.

On April 1, 1948, the day after the Arbitral Tribunal ceased to exist, the East punjab government cut off water supplies in every canal crossing into pakistan. These consisted of the Central Bari Doab canal system, the Dipalpur canal system, and the Bahawalpur state distributary. Of this action, Sir patrick Spens, Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunl, said before the joint meeting in London of the East India Association and the Overseas League on February 23, 1955:

I remember very well suggesting whether it was not desirable that some order should be made about the continued flow of water,

… But we were invited by both the Attorney-Generals [of India and pakistan] to come to our decision on the basis that there ould be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water, and the award which my colleagues made, in which I had no part, they made on that basis. Our awards were published at the end of March, 1948. I am going to say nothing more about it except that I was very much upset that almost within a day or two there was a grave interference with the flow of water on the basis of which our awards had been made.”

As soon as the Arbitral Tribunal ceased to exist, all promises made before it by the representative of India that “there would be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water” were forgotten and water was shut off from pakistan canals on which the irrigation of 1.66 million acres depended. East Punjab now contended that Pakistan had no right to any water and demanded seigniorage charges as a condition for reopening the canals, There was acute distress which, ith every day that passed, became more and more intolerable. In large areas where the subsoil water is brackish there was no drinking water. Millions of People faced the ruin of their crops, the loss of their heards, and ventual starvation due to lack of water.

Under these distressful circumstances, a delegation was sent from pakistan to Delhi in the beginning of May, 1948, to seek a solution to the problem. The delegation was led by Ghulam mhammad, the Finance Minister of pakistan, and included two ministers from west Punjab – Shaukat Hayat khan and Mumtaz Daultana. At the meetings in Delhi, East Punjab resresentatives insisted that they would not restore the flow of water to the canals unless West punjab ac-knowledged that it had no right to the water. To this the representatives of West punjab could not agree.The pakistan proposal that the two governments should submit their differences to the arbitration of the International Court of Justice was not acceptble 1, India. There was an impasse. Ghulam Muhammad appealed to Mountbatten who consulted with Nehru. A statement was then placed before Ghulam Muhammad, and he was asked to sign it without changing a word or a comma – a condition for restoring the flow of water.

On May 4, 1948 thestatement was signed by Ghulam Muhammad and the two west punjab ministers on the one hand and by nehru and two East punjab ministers on the other. The statement declared that, apart from the question of law involved, the governments were anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit. The East punjab government would progressively diminish its supply to the central Bari Doab and Dipalpur canals in West punjab in order to give reasonable time to the West punjab government to tap alternative sources. The statement announced that water was being restored to these canals, that west punjab was to deposit in esorow such “ad hoc sum as may be specified by the prime Minister of India” to cover certain disputed payments, and that after an examination by each side of the legal and other issues invlved, futher Meetings would take place. In conclusion, the Dominion governments expressed the hope that a friendly solution would be reached.

Though India restored the flo of water to the Dipalpur canal and the principal branches of the Central Bari Doab canals, water was still withheld from the Balawalpur state distributary and nine lesser distributaries of the Central Bari Doab system. Eventually considerable areas in Bahawalpur state reverted to desert Notwithstanding the compulsion under which the arrangement was signed, pakistan performed its part and deposited in escrow the same specifid by the prim Minister of India.

Sardar Saukat Hayat in his book, The Nation That Lost Its Soul (20)

corroborates the broad facts of the whole sordid mess with additional information:-

“The Division of Asset committee had been formed in East and West Punjab and met alternately at Lahore and jallandur, the temporary capital of East punjab. The rules were that, in case of differences between us, the case would be refereed to the Arbitral Tribunal headed by the Chief justice of India, Sir patrick Sens.

“The question of Division of water between Indian and pakistan punjab was to be decided at a meeting to be held in jallandur. I attended this particular meeting along with the secretary Cum Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Department Mr.Abdul Hameed, and the chief secretary Hafiz Abdul Majeed ICS. We were accommodated in a ramshackle old hotel.

“The next day we had to tackle the matter of the division of water on which our economty entirely depended. We discussed it amongst our own party and came to the conclusion that even if we took this problem to the Arbitral Tribunal and got a favorable decision, how were we going to get it implemented when the Headworks had been unfairly allotted to India in the so-called Raccliffe Award Therefore, we decided that we should find a via media to share the expenses of running the Head works and part of the canal system located in the East punjab. The Hindus, after long discussion, came to an agreement. Alas, in keeping with their chanakian (Machiavellian) philosophy they reneged later, a day after the end of the Arbitral Tribunal. They stopped our share of water from the Head works at Madhopur feeding Barjdoab and from the Ferozepur Headwork which supplied water to Dipalpur Canal, irrigation the Montgomery area, and to the Bahawalpur Canal. This came as a deep shock to me.”

Sir Feroze Khan Noon in his book, from memory (21)

Inforduces yet another dimension to the sordid late:- (P-264)

International Cort of Justice at The Hague, because no Court could have denied s our riparian rights of the waters of the Eastern Rivers. But what is the use of winning suits in Court, if such a decision cannot be backed up by the physical power to enforce it?

The Indus Water Teaty, the negotiations for which had started in March 1952 under the aegis of World Bank (then known as International Bank for Reconstruction and development, IBRD), presented perhaps the last chance to correct the wrong committed during the previous two occasions. But that was not to be.

In 1951 Mr. David E. Lilienthal, former head of the, seven state Tennessee Vlley Authority (T.V.A), on the model of which WAPDA is established, visited India and pakistan. He recorded his observation in an article captioned “Another Korea in the Making?” which appeared in the 4th August 1951 issue of “Colliers” magazine. (22)

Mr. Lilienthal called the water dispute between India and pakistan “pure dynamite” and “a powder keg”. He warned that “peace in Indo-pak sub-continent is not in sight with these inflammables lying around” and that “these people will live or die by the way they handle the waters of Indus”.

He proposed “a joint use of this truly international river basin on an engineering basis” that would make the riparians work together on a “common project that is not political but functional, a part of life and based on technical skill and human need”

The project was proposed to be “jointly financed”, (perhaps with the help of World Bank) and the Indus River System was to be “developed as a unit --- disigned, built and operated as a unit, as is the seven-state T.V.A system bach in the U.S.A”.

The quantum of water that Mr.Lilienthal was referring to in the Indus River System and was to be divided by Indus Water Treaty was as follows:

Western Rivers (23) Eastern Vivers (24)

Indus 90 MAF Sutlej 14 MAF

Jehlum 23 MAF Beas 13 MAF

Chenab 26 MAF Ravi 3 MAF

Total 140 MAF or 80% Total 33 MAF or 20%

The break up of the 33 MAF of the Eastern rivers was: (25)

Quantum reaching pakistan 24 MAF

Indian canal withdrawals 9 MAF

Total 33 MAF

The cultivable area of the Indus Basin within paistan and india and that which was served with canal irrigation wa:- (26)

Pakistan

Million India

acres Pakistan

(Percentage) India

1 Cultivable area of indus Basin 74.8 7.6 91% 9%

2 Cultivable area served by 30.7 2.1 94% 6%

3 Remaining cultivable area within Indus Basin 44.1 5.5 88% 12%

The pakisntan delegation which had at least one member each from the riparian provinces of West pakistan along with members from Bahawalpur and Khairpur states, had an iron clad case in their favour. Though al! five Punjab rivers originated in India, the cultivable area of the Indus Basin in that country was only 9% out of which als only 6% was canal irrigated.

In stopping the waters flowing into Pakistan India was committing an act of grave provocation (27). It was claiming absolute sovereignty on the waters flowingy through its territory. But the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, also referred to as the Harmon Doctrine, was dead and buried by the end or 19th century (28), 50 years before India raised and utilized it. In these fifty years international law on the rights of riparian states on international rivers was evolving and taking shape. For example in the U.S.A which had 51 states then, and a number of inter-state rivers, the Supreme Court had adjudicated on a multilude of intricate disputes handing down brilliant and truly land mark decisions, the help of which could easily have been sought by the Pakistan delegation negotiationg with India under IBRD.

The case of Lac Lanoux is an apt example. River Carol crosses from France into the Spanish Pyrenees. In the early 1950s, France, asserting absolute sovereignty, proposed to divert water from the river at Font-Vine for hydropower generation. It offered to compensate Spain monetarily. Spain objected asserting that the riverine integrity (basin integrity) be kept supreme and its irrigation needs be given priority. Even when France agreed to divert back first the water needed for Spanish irrigation, and then all the diverted water, through a tunnel between watersheds, Spain insisted on absolute riverine integrity, claiming that it did not want French hands on the water tap. The arbitral tribunal ruled in 1957 that “Territorial integrity … must bend before all international obligation”. This ruling made possible the 1958 Lac Lanoux Treaty (revised in 1970), in which it is agreed that such water that is diverted out-of-basin for French hydropower generation, must be returned, in similar quantity, before the stream reaches Spanish territory.(29)

The astonishing letter of Mr.M.S Qureshi reads 30)

“Provincial consideration were allowed to influence judgement and action. Indus link was at first recommended to government without even a mention to any of the senior members of the delegation. The proposal was turned down by the government. It playd no part in our negotiations with the Indians or the bank. When the senior members were consulted, they unanimously opposed even a mention of the link. Mr.Hameed went to the extent of offering a bait to Mr. Hassan, representative of Bahawalpur that through such a link Bahawalpur canals at Sulemanki would receive Rabi supplies from the Indus. Mr. Hassan knew the position of supplies and as a matter of principle he refused to support him saying that he was there to fight the case of Pakistan and not of a particular province or state. Internal disputes were best left over to the future.

“In the same manner every attempt was made to throw out Sindh,s uses from the western tributaries. Incorrect calculations were embodied in the Pakistan plan to the effect that not only the allocations of the new barrages on the Indus would be met in April, May but that there would be surplus left over for development. Both Mr.Hassan and myself disagreed and Mr. Tiptons calculations supported our conclusion that in actuality in most of the years there would be shortages. After much persuasion and addendum was issued by Mr. Hameed showing the serious nature of shortages in these months.

“Mr.Hameed regarded Pakistan,s waters as though they were his personal property. At first his secretary Mr. Khalilur Rehman who is supposed to be the custodian of his inner feelings, started belittling allocation and saying that ultimately these rights would be given up I protested to Mr.Hameed against this Loose talk and made it very clear that not a single drop of allocated supplies will be parted with.

“Later Mr. Hameed told Mr.Sarwar Jan Khan that for sake of an agreement he would even give up allocations and the same day he told Mr. Hassan that he would even agree to marhutunnel if Pakistan was given control over that strip of land. It did not bother Mr.Hameed whether this additional diversion of water by India did any damage to Pakistan.

“The Pakistan Designer (Mr.Hameed) also unfortunately failed to their confidence of the senior members of the delegation. It may be recalled here that Mr.Hameed happened to be the senior most Muslim enginer in the Punjab at the time of partition. He failed to put up the case of division of waters to the Paartition Committee and later before the arbitral tribunal. It was he who without any consultation with his government on the waters of Ravi and Sutlej undertook seigniorage charges. He therefore was very keen to reach an agreement at all costs. The senior members of the delegation on the other hand insisted upon acting on the advice of Honourabl Mr. Mohammed Ali Finance Minister who on the 2nd September 1953 advused as fikkiws:

“The delegation should be reasonable but at the same time should never give up merely for the sake of agreement more than was in Pakistan,s long term interest to vive up. The delegation should be reasonable but firm”.

“There was thus a difference in outlook which was no very conducive to good team work.

“Mr.Naseer,s pleading with General Wheeler that they could not afford to go back without an agreement only convinced the bank that Pakistan would accept anything for the sake of agreement.

“Even this most detrimental proposal seemed most palatable to Mr.Hamee. His secretary (Mr.Khalilur Rehman) and he hiself agreed with Mr.Sarwar Jan Khan on about the 1st April 1954 that no decision could be expected from a government that was tottering.

“Decision might as well be taken in Washington and the responsibility would not be that of the Engineers but of someone else. Perhaps he referred to Mr.Naseer Ahmed.

“Mr. Sarwar Jan Khan ridiculed any such venture as being absolutely beyond their jurisdiction”.

The desperation shown by the members from Punjab to reach an agreement (as indicated by Mr.M.S.Qureshi) and the intense difference of opinion among members of Pakistan delegation must have made the Indians ecstatic.

Whth the advantage of hind sight it can safely be said that the politicians of India and the senior irrigation officials, then, must have easily analysed the political situation of West Pakistan and the out come of the “parity” drive with the Eastern Wing. It is equally safe to say that they must have known who will wield the power and the privilege in the about-tobecome political unity of West Pakistan.

They delayed the negotiation sufficiently, aided by the dithering Pakistan delegation, till One Unit was proclaimed on 15th Oct 1955 effectively merging all four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan) and federal capital (then Karachi) into a single province, West Pakistan.

Needless to say that the negotiating team was disbanded and a fresh negotiating team constituted under the name of Indus Basin Advisory Board (IBAB). All pesky members from smaller provinces were dropped and following members, all, without exception, from Punjab, included:-(31)

Mr G.Mueenudin

K.B.M.Adbul Hameed C.E Punjab

Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman

Mr.S.Kirmani

Mr.S.I.Mehboob

Mr.S.M.Niaz

Mr. Altaf Hussain

In the presentation before justice Fazle Akber in 1971, the agent of Sindh, AWF Shaikh commenting on this team, said (32), “Sir, at that time, Mr.A.R.Kazi S.Q.A, (presently chief Engineering advisor to Government of Pakistan) who is the senior-most civil Engineer serving in Pakistan, was chief Engineer (Water) WAPDA, but it was unfortunate for Sindh that he was not included in the IBAB. His inclusion was all the more necessary because it was WAPDA which had to get the works constructed as an Agent to central Government. It is surprising that Junior Executive Engineers and superintending Engineers of Pnjab Service were included but an Engineer of such a high calibre and status was not included simply because… I need not elabrate the inference which is there”.

As was expected, Indus Water Treaty was signed on 19th Sept 1960 in Karachi by the president of Pakistan (Ayub Khan) and Prime Minister of India (Jawahir Lal Nehru) surrendering Pakistan’s right on the three eastern tributaries of Indus. Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, in return for 175 million dollars from India. Another $ 150 million were granted by other countries and World Band loaned $ 150 million to construct Mangla dam on Jehlum, along with a number of link canals, as replacement works to drain water of Indus and Jehlum into the dry beds of the three eastern tributaries. All details of the Treaty and the financial arrangements were finalized by the IBAB.

Some very disturbing question’s remain in th IBAB decision of signing Indus Water Treaty:-

1. Why was India, which had 9% cultivable area and only 6% canal irrigated land of Indus Basin, given 33 MAF or 20% water of Indus River System? The result can be seen 40 years later that India has taken the hage 18500 Cusic Rajasthan canal from the Harike barrage at the confluence of rivers Sutlej and Beas.

2. What was the secret agreement mentioned by Shaukat Hayat Khan when he writes that, “therefore we decided that we should find a via media to share the expenses of running the Head Works and part of the canal system located in the East Punjab. The Hindus, after long discussion came to an “agreement”. Alas, in keeping with their Chanakian (Machiavelian) philosophy they reneged later” (34).

At what levd was This agreement authorized and by whom? Was the federal government consulted and where is the record of such consultation and authorization?

3. Was it a conspiracy conceived and orchestrated by the west Punjab’s official and politicians by means of which Sindh, which was a co-sharer of the eastern tributaries, was sidelined and the historic conflict between Sindh and Punjab was turned into a quarrel between East Punjab and west Panjab, and then between India and Pakistan?(35)

Was it a continuation of the thought prevalent in those early days of Pakistan that the struggling new state would not survive and therefore the opportunity be availed by which, before the two states merged again to become one whole India, Sindh Punjab dispute was settled by dividing the waters of the eastern tributaries between the two Panjabs leaving Sindh out cold and dry?

4. Looking at the chain of events starting from the removal of the item of assessment of irrigation assets from the of agenda of Committee

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Notes Pakistan Studies Water Resources

Kalabagh Dam, An Acute Contradictory Issue of Pakistan - 5

Differing Points of View on Kalabagh Dam

Punjab

Kalabagh dam is extremely advantageous for Punjab even if it is equally harmful for the other riparian provinces. The point of view of Punjab therefore, shared enthusiastically by WAPDA, officially declared and unofficially felt, is:

i. Kalabagh Dam will generate 3600 MW of cheap hydroelectricity when the country is short of energy. Since the hydel power generation will be situated in the geographical boundaries of Punjab, the royalty of hydel power will also go to the province. The substantial industrial activity in Punjab will get a tremendous boost with the availability of less expensive power.

ii. The quantity of water stored in the Tarbela and Mangla dam reservoirs is gradually decreasing due to sedimentation. Therefore and additional storage dam is urgently needed. Other wise the advantage of “Green revolution” would not be sustainable.

iii. The third dam on Indus River System will substantially increase the total quantity of stored water, so that additional and timely releases for irrigation purposes will be made, increasing food grain production.

iv. KBD will help reduce, or avert, the effects of floods by absorbing and storing the peak flood flows.

Water from Kalabagh Dam will be used for irrigation through two canals tapped from the right bank and left bank outlet works as follows:

a. The left bank canal will be 170 miles (272 Km) long and will have a capacity of 15,000 cusecs. It will lift about 6.65 MAF water annually from the dam, to irrigate 380,000 acres (145,000 ha) falling on both of its sides as it passes through Mianwali, Khushab and Jehlum districts. The Rabi and Kharif requirements for the cultivation is expected to be 0.78 MAF and 1.23 MAF respectively. The remaining 4.65 MAF water is proposed to be drained into Jehlum at Rasul Barrage to meet the shortage of Mangla command.

(Source : Salient Features of KBD: Revised June 1989, by WAPDA)

b. The Right Bank canal is to be 98 miles (157 Km) long and will draw another 15,000 cusecs from the KBD to irrigate 2.12 million acres lifting 6.21 MAF per year. The canal is to be so constructed that it will irrigate 651,300 acres of Dera Ismail Khan beyond CRB canal command. Another 732,500 acres are proposed to be irrigated by lifting the water 50 to 260 feet. Yet another 733,700 acres are proposed to be irrigated in Kurran Basin by lifting water to an incredulous 700 feet!!.

(Source : Salient Featues of KBD : Revised June 1989)

v. Punjab considers all water flowing into sea a total “waste”.

NWFP

The North West Frontier Province has vehemently opposed Kalabagh dam through its provincial Assembly that has passed resolution four times rejecting Kalabagh dam.

The reason Frontier opposes Kalabagh Dam is that there is not a single direct advantage accruing to the province. It only gets pain. For example:

i. By constructing a dam on Indus at Kalabagh, the Attock gorge is expected to be made a reservoir that will store 7.9 MAF gross of water (6.1 MAF live). The dam wall will be 260 feet high from the river bed that will raise the water level of Indus throughout Attock gorge, right through Haro river confluence and up the Akohra on Kabul river. Nowshera, a city of 180,000 people falls on both the left and right banks of Kabul river and down town Nowshera city will stand 24 feet below the river dykes. In case the protective dykes break, Nowshera city will meet a painful death. In any case in about 50 years time Nowshera city and adjoining areas will become waterlogged swamplands.

ii. The reservoir will inundate about 35,000 acres of irrigated land (4,500 acres in NWFP and 31,500 acres in Punjab)

iii. 34,500 people will be displaced from immediate vicinity of the dam (another 48,500 In Punjab) and are proposed to be rehabilitated. But many more who are not displaced but are dependent upon the river or the grazing lands for their livelihood, like herdsmen and boatmen, will face economic hardship and consequential migration. The fate of about 3000 affected people of Tarbela Dam must have hardened NWFP govt.’s stand Displaced in 1970, about 100,000 people living in Terbela reservoir area were provided alternate land in Guddu Barrage command. For these affected people the drastic change in environ, inhospitable weather and the hostile local population was too much to cope with. Majority of them sold their lands and moved back turning into rootless paupers that had lost everything. But there are about 3,000 cases that have yet to be finalized even after 20 years of the commissioning of Tarbela Dam.

iv. 50 km Attock – Naushera Road will be submerged by Kalabagh reservoir and will have to be relocated and built. Six rail and road bridges will also need to be relocated and rebuilt, costing enormous amount of money, that surprisingly, has not been included in the expenditure of Kalabagh dam.

Mardan Salinity Control and Rehabilitation Project (SCARP) will be severly affected due to SCARP drainage level being lower than the upper of the KBD reservoir.

Article 161 (2) of the constitution of Pakistan, 1973, says that the province in which the hydroelectric project is situated will get “net profit” of the power generated. In the case of Kalabagh Dam, the reservoir area is situated in NWFP, whereas power station is located in Punjab. Therefore the profit of power generated will go to Punjab while NWFP will only get problems and pain.

3. Balochistan

The largest province of Pakistan, Balochistan (Area: 347,190 sq. Kms. Out of Pakistan’s 796,095 sq Kms) does not touch River Indus and isnot a riparian in the strictest sense. Still the Pat feeder from Guddu Barage with 3,400 cusecs irrigates about 300,000 acres in the province and a recent request of Balochistan to remodel Pat feeder will increase the flow to 6,000 cusecs irrigating a further 200,000 acres.

Balochistan’s opposition to KBD is therefore based on its apprehension that future requests for more water from Indus will meet little success if Kalabagh project over stretches demand if water in Indus River System.

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Kalabagh Dam, An Acute Contradictory Issue of Pakistan - 1

Historical Overview of This issue

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Differing Points of View on Kalabagh Dam

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