Articles by "Pakistan Foreign Policy"
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The Pakistani Policy of Peace 

By Lubna Umar

According to the US State Department’s Deputy Spokesperson Ms Marie Harf, Mehsud was a direct threat to US national interests and had extensive links to the al Qaeda. 


The new government seems to be in control and a policy of peace is what the authorities have developed and are eager to employ in the backdrop of a chaotic security situation. The government even after the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud has reiterated its original stance that only dialogue with them would bring peace to the country. The Pakistan prime minister said that the efforts would be made that would take the peace process forward, and surely, that is the best way to move ahead. Not because there is or was no need to fight, but because whatever that had to be done in terms of military operations is now complete. There is a dire need to take the counter insurgency plan to the next level where negotiations ought to be made for a peaceful future co-existence.
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ONE of the first things Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did after taking oath was to send a message outlining his foreign policy priorities to Pakistani missions abroad.

The move reflects his interest in getting Pakistan’s foreign relations right and signals this intent to the implementers of the county’s foreign policy vision around the world. There was one observation, though not unexpected, that is nonetheless noteworthy: the importance he laid on Pakistan’s neighbourhood.

Reorienting Pakistan’s focus to the South Asian region in a positive way, especially with regard to India, will be no mean feat. No one knows this better than Mr Sharif given his experience with attempts to improve Indo-Pak ties during his last stint.

Much has been written about the substantive issues and disputes at hand. Let me, instead, focus on a seemingly more mundane, but nonetheless critical, issue of getting the management of the foreign policy machinery right. Without this, the government is sure to fall short on the substance.

To begin with, Sharif needs someone to take charge of the situation. Any confusion in the roles of the key people will only allow detractors to stonewall positive initiatives. His decision to not appoint a full time foreign minister is disturbing in this regard. Prime ministers holding on to such portfolios can work when the foreign policy direction of a country is likely to be a continuation of the status quo. In such cases, the bureaucracy keeps chugging along with its routines and the prime minister, in his capacity asforeign minister, only has to tinker on the edges.

If the goal is truly transformative, though, a full-time, empowered manager who commands respect and has some expertise in the subject is likely to be your best bet. Also, in the Pakistani context, a disempowered foreign minister — much less an absent one — always tends to force important foreign actors to go knocking at GHQ’s doors to get the job done. This is exactly the opposite of what Sharif wants; ostensibly, his decision to keep the portfolio is driven by this concern in the first place.

Sharif has already decided on his two principal foreign policy managers: Sartaj Aziz and Tariq Fatemi. Both are solid choices. But in the absence of a minister (or till one of them is brought into that role) they need the right kind of empowerment to pull off the task Sharif has outlined for them and those who would be working for them in theforeign ministry. A clear signal to this effect needs to come from the prime minister. Disturbingly, some PML-N members confide that this may not happen for purely parochial reasons to do with internal party politics.

Next, one shouldn’t overlook the challenge these officials will face in getting a team in place that shares the prime minister’s vision. Some would argue that perhaps even they don’t fully buy into it. Even if so, they — given their proximity to the prime minister and his faith in them — will have little difficulty in rallying behind him. The real challenge will be to pick likeminded people for key ambassadorial positions and desks in the ministry.

At least on India and Afghanistan, this is not only about finding the brightest and the best. The problem is that the Foreign Office’s traditional outlook on these countries has never been too different from that of the security establishment. Sharif’s vision is light years ahead and it will require quite a jolt to this highly competent, yet characterised by inertia, machinery to get the ball rolling. You need people truly ideologically invested in his vision to take the lead.

The mother of all challenges, however, is undoubtedly going to lie in the civil-military domain. The security establishment and sections of the Foreign Office most closely aligned with its vision have run the country’s India and Afghanistan policy for years. There is no way to make a clean break from that, especially a year before the 2014 Nato exit from Afghanistan. Sharif’s team will have to work this incrementally and without considering the military a competitor. The most crucial role for Nawaz’s core team will be to act as credible and effective interlocutors between the prime minister’s office and the GHQ.

The best-case scenario is that the civilian and military enclaves have frank and regular conversations and agree on a joint agenda to move forward on regional relations and other priorities. The more probable and less attractive possibility is that, in typical Pakistani style, sycophants — in trying to appear more loyal than the king — will begin to saturate both the prime minister and the military top brass with rumours and stories that confirm their worst fears about the other and end up encouraging a rift.

Here, the role of the prime minister’s team will be pivotal. They will have to be the loudest credible voices he can hear and believe. And they will have to prevent such a rift at all costs. Similarly, the military will have to keep its side in check and take the shifting institutional equilibrium in favour of the civilians in its stride rather than seeing this as a dent to personal and institutional egos.

By MOEED YUSUF , Dawn 10-6-13
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Pakistan and its Foreign Policy 

By Syed Mansoor Hussain

If we did not have an ongoing confrontation with India, why would we need such a big army? For all practical purposes, Pakistan became an army with a country. 

A friend of mine recently asked me why I never comment on Pakistani foreign policy. My response was that the Pakistan army has a foreign policy but does Pakistan have a foreign policy? His question did, however, start me thinking. If someone asks me to sum up Pakistan’s foreign policy, I will just say ‘India’. As a Pakistani-American acquaintance in the US once insisted, Pakistan and being a Pakistani is all about not being Indian and no, he is not a Punjabi.

Here, let me just sum up some of the ‘facts’ that I grew up with. My father’s family migrated from the district of Gurdaspur when they found out that it was not going to be a part of Pakistan. My childhood memories are replete with stories of how thousands of Muslims were massacred in their homes and how marauding bands of Hindus and Sikhs preyed upon unarmed caravans of Muslims coming to Pakistan and how they brutally killed everyone including children. And how trains would arrive in Lahore full of dead passengers.

Then there were the stories of Indian perfidy. How India prevented the princely states of Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad Deccan from joining Pakistan. And how the Indians refused to pay up Pakistan’s share of money held in the Bank of India, thus almost driving the new country into bankruptcy. But then things started to calm down a bit during the mid-1950s. Pakistan it seemed was there to stay, and the new country also seemed to be doing better. So, we watched Indian movies and listened to songs from those movies playing on the radio, and stopped thinking too much of what happened around the time of the partition.

But Kashmir continued to be a sticking point. Most of us in Pakistan felt at that time that the Kashmir ‘issue’ would be decided in our favour by the United Nations (UN), and all would be just fine. We joined international defence pacts with the US so we could get arms aid and also get the US on our side in our dispute with India over Kashmir. However, by the time the 1960s came around it became pretty obvious that India was not going to give up Kashmir. Then came the 1965 war between India and Pakistan that we ‘won’. But still no Kashmir!

Pakistan had by now come under complete control of the army and, therefore, ‘foreign policy’ was entirely about India. After all, if we did not have an ongoing confrontation with India, why would we need such a big army? For all practical purposes, Pakistan became an army with a country. And then came 1971. Perhaps the saddest year in our history. Pakistan went mad. Pakistanis killed Pakistanis without mercy in what was then East Pakistan and India stepped in and helped to break Pakistan up. The Pakistan army was utterly humiliated and it withdrew to the barracks to ‘lick its chops’, handing the country over to the ‘bloody civilians’.

Once the Pakistan army had recuperated from its humiliating defeat, it took over Pakistan once again. Then the Pakistan army got a present from above. The USSR invaded Afghanistan. Suddenly the US that had ignored Pakistan found new love for it. Money and arms poured in so that the Pakistan army could help Afghan ‘mujahideen’ fight the Russian invaders. The generals in Pakistan got rich ‘beyond the dreams of avarice’, while the Islamist general running Pakistan pushed the country into the lap of ‘petro-Dollar Islam’. The Soviets were eventually forced to leave Afghanistan and the Pakistan army declared victory! The Pakistan army it now seemed would run Pakistan forever. 

But then came another intervention from ‘above’. As a result another ‘democratic’ dispensation came into existence. However, a new paradigm of ‘strategic depth’ became established. Now the army was needed more than ever to also prevent the perfidious Indians from establishing a foothold in our backyard in Afghanistan. This mindset eventually led to the Taliban and creation of jihadist ‘surrogates’ trained to fight future proxy wars in India. For almost a decade of the supposed democratic interregnum, the army continued to run foreign policy.

Mian Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister (PM) with an overwhelming mandate in 1997. He thought that it was time for the ‘bloody’ civilians to actually run the country. The Pakistan economy tanked after the ‘tit for tat’ nuclear explosions and the following international sanctions. Even so, the Indian PM was invited to Lahore and it seemed that having achieved ‘nuclear’ parity, India and Pakistan were finally ready to ‘live and let live’. But the army was not taking this lying down. Mian Sahib’s ‘handpicked’ army chief created the Kargil ‘situation’ that brought to an end any peace initiatives between India and Pakistan.

Of course, the army took over once again. Things looked bad for Pakistan but then 9/11 happened. This time the US and its NATO allies invaded Afghanistan. And the generals started getting rich again. But the US after a while realised that the Pakistan army was not playing ‘fair’. The president-general was packed off and another democratic dispensation was brought in but foreign policy was still run by the army. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 made sure that the weak civilian government in Pakistan could not possibly improve relations with India.

Mian Sahib is now back with another ‘mandate’. But before he can do much else he has to first take care of the economic situation, control the terrorists, some of whom are supported indirectly by the army; and keep ‘his cool’ while the US and its allies leave Afghanistan. Perhaps then we might see a ‘pro-Pakistan’ and not just a ‘pro-army’foreign policy. Of course, the first step will have to be normalisation of relations with India. Will the Pakistan army let him do that and will the Indian army let the Indian government reciprocate in good faith? That remains to be seen.

The writer has practised and taught medicine in the US. He can be reached at smhmbbs70@yahoo.com
Source: Link
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Pakistan Foreign Policy

“The foreign policy of a country is in a sense a projection of its internal policies ,social, political and economic.”
(F. M. Muhammad Ayub Khan)

Pakistan was born under inauspicious circumstances. As with all other countries, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy is determined by the inescapable facts of history and of geography and by special influences which may be of transitory nature. In the words of P.A Reynolds, the Foreign Policy is defined as under:-

“The range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, in order to advance the national interests.”

Foreign Policy consists of the external actions taken by decision makers with the intention of achieving long-range goals and short-term objectives. Action is constrained by the perceived circumstances of the state, which includes its geography, its economy, its demography its political structure, culture and tradition, its military-strategy situation. But action is taken with reference to other bodies (states) similarly acting on the international stage, and is likewise constrained by their action. This may be called the international environment of decision-makers. 

DETERMINANTS OF PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY
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1. Security, 2. Ideology 3. National Interests 4. Diplomacy 5. Public Opinion 6. Decision making 


PRINCIPLES OF PAKSITAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 

1. Security 2. Ideology 3.National interests 4. Détente and peaceful relations . 5. Non alignment 6. Close relations with Muslim countries 7. Support f independence movements

As a matter of fact, a la any other country, the logically primary influence on foreign policy of Pakistan lies in the goals that policy seeks to achieve. These are normally security, welfare, and preservation or promotion of values. The search for security is perennial. All foreign policies of all states are basically influenced by it. For three centuries, for example, French decision –makers sought to establish France’s eastern and north-eastern frontier on the Rhine. In the case of Pakistan If the main concern of the Christian West is containment of Chinese Communism, the main concern of Muslim Pakistan, is the containment of militarist and militant Hinduism. The fact remains that Pakistan jointed the CENTO, SEATO, etc in the mid of 1950s largely to protect her interests against the future aggression of India.

No state is autarkic, or self- sufficient, at least in the only sense that is politically relevant. Every state can be economically self-sufficient in the sense that the territory in question could support some number of people at some standard of living. Deficiencies whether of materials, or food, or markets, or capital, or technical skills, do exist and the foreign policy of a state must endeavor to arrange their supply. Pakistan’s earnest involvement in the international political arena has been mainly due to the fact that it wanted to make up its deficiencies in certain fields.

Third among basic goals is the desire to preserve or promote values. Since Pakistan had come into existence in the name of Islam hence promotion of cordial and close relationships with the Muslim states has formed the cardinal principle of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan’s membership of OIC and unswerving support for the just cause of Palestinians speak volumes about our efforts in this connection. 

A Critical View of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy and our Future Strategy:


“Our Foreign Policy is one of the friendliness and 
goodwill towards all the nations of the world We
do not cherish aggressive designs against any
country or nation. We believe in the principle of 
honesty and fairplay in national and international
dealings. Pakistan will never be found lacking in 
upholding priciples of the United Nations’ Charter.”

(Quaid-e-Azam, Feb: 1948)

The perusal of the above passage entails that the “Quaid” wanted Pakistan to play a honourable role based on the principles and norms of International Law in the arena of international politics. However the study of External Policy of Pakistan over the last 50 years of independence manifests that Pakistan’s geo-political location on the world map and her strategic vulnerability viz-a-viz India could not permit her to pursue that independent policy. Resultantly the foreign Policy of Pakistan has passed through the following several phases of development, responding to the changing pattern of relationship with the big powers.

1. Era of Neutrality2. Era of Allainces3. Era of Bilateralism4. Era of Non-alignment


A critical analysis of the foreign policy pursued in the last half of a century transpires that Pakistan’s Foreign Policy has largely revolved around a triangle of India , China and the U.S with the objectives to counter India, befriend China (an enemy of India), and serving the U.S interests

4. Era of Non-alignment

A critical analysis of the foreign policy pursued in the last half of a century transpires that Pakistan’s Foreign Policy has largely revolved around a triangle of India , China and the U.S with the objectives to counter India, befriend China (an enemy of India), and serving the U.S interests as in the 1960, 1971, 1980s and in the aftermath of Sept: 11, or seeking its involvement through scare scenarios like the Bomb, Drugs and fundamentalism.
The future strategy of Pakistan in its foreing policy must be a “shift from traditional diplamcy to economic diplomacy as well as cultural diplomacy” 
Relations with distant Godfathers are no substitute for bonds in the region of a country’s location. Pakistan can have the best relations with the US, but if it loses out in its neighborhood , with hostility form Iran and Afghanistan , distancing from Central Asia and a cooling off with China , then it would end up undermining its core interests. It is all the more essential for the success of the foreign policy of Pakistan that it has to be rooted in domestic base which includes political stability, national consensus, sound economy, effective deterrence and above all, quality of leadership.
Pakistan’s priority should be a Foreign Policy that has no disconnect either with domestic politics or with regional realities. An effective policy requires domestic stability and a national consensus on issues. 
The upshot of the above account is that, the Government and people of Pakistan should remain on their guards, for in International relations there are neither eternal friends nor eternal enemies, the only thing eternal is the “National Interest”. Thus it requires that through deft diplomacy , using innovative and novel means we must strive to promote our interests and at the same time keep a triangular balance among the world giants i.e The U.S, The China ,and the E.U.

(Thanx AMB)
Any sorta supplementation by friends is most welcome. 
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A New Look Foreign Policy?

By M Ziauddin

Let us stop looking at China through the eyes of our 1960s’ generation. It is no more a country fenced in under a bamboo curtain looking out only through a narrow Pakistani window. It has gone global since 1979. Today, China is an economic giant, second only to the US in size. With India alone, the size of its annual trade is $60 billion, expected to reach $100 billion soon against an annual trade of no more than about $12 billion with Pakistan and anticipating no dramatic change for the better in the near future. Against this backdrop, when one describes the Pakistan-China relationship as being higher than Himalayas, deeper than oceans and sweeter than honey, it sounds more like a boring cliche. Of course, this description could be true to some extent if applied to our strategic relationship with China. But strategic relations without the underpinning of strong economic ties have been known to have withered away when either of the two partners would, dictated by changing self-interests, develop new or mutually opposing strategic interests. That this has not happened to the Pakistan-China relationship so far is no guarantee that it would never happen. So, to avert that eventuality, we need to start focusing vigorously, without losing any more time, on attracting as much Chinese investment as possible in the manufacturing sectors, which have become economically unviable in China because of rising labour costs in that country.
The way the decades-long Pentagon-GHQ strategic relationship, sans any significant trade or investment ties, has gone into a tailspin in recent years reinforces this argument. Had these relations been buttressed by meaningful bilateral economic cooperation rather than keeping them solely dependent on defence cooperation they would, perhaps, have survived the recent widening of the trust deficit between the two, with Washington and Islamabad suspecting each other’s Afghan endgame intentions. So, let us also stop looking at the US through the eyes of our Cold War generation. Superpowers don’t have friends. They have clients. If we don’t wish to remain a client of the US anymore, we better not be on its wrong side as well. Let us not try playing games with it, like using the China option to neutralise US influence in the region or using the Afghan Taliban in our ‘custody’ and our access to the inaccessible-to-the-world Mullah Omar to play the spoiler in the Afghan endgame. In the first place, China would never go that far for our sake. Secondly, without the assistance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which the US would see to it would not be forthcoming this time around, there is no future for a Talibanised Afghanistan. Also, no one in the neighbourhood, including China, Pakistan, Iran or the Central Asian countries, would feel secure with the Taliban back in Kabul.
So, the best option for Pakistan is to remain relevant in the endgame, not by being a US client or being a spoiler but by being a pragmatic facilitator in the global efforts to restore peace and stability to Afghanistan through an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process. The signals coming from Washington are very clear. The US wants to give India a role in the post-withdrawal Afghanistan. That is, perhaps, why US Secretary of State John Kerry visited New Delhi last month and currently, the US Vice-President, Joe Biden, is visiting India. Both have avoided Pakistan. We had only a low-level US official visiting us in recent weeks in the person of Af-Pak US representative James Dobbins. So, pragmatism further dictates that we stop wasting our breath resisting India’s entry into the Afghan endgame. India has galloped way away from Pakistan economically, enhancing the asymmetry already existing between our two countries. Its economic ties with the sole superpower, the US, and the emerging Asian superpower, China, have expanded the vested interests of the two in New Delhi’s political well-being. Let us profit from the emerging situation by enhancing our own economic ties with India without, of course, giving up our historic positions on bilateral disputes. By the way, nothing and nobody can undo the geographical, cultural and ethnic ties that exist between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is a gift of nature. So, as a first step, let us offer MFN status to India and follow up by providing a New Delhi transit trade facility to Afghanistan and beyond. This will also guarantee that India, in its own economic interests, would ensure peace in Pakistan by keeping RAW on a leash.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 24th, 2013.
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Guiding Pakistan’s foreign policy
March 11, 2012 
By Farhan Bokhari

Pakistan’s long awaited decision on Friday to appoint a new Director General to head the country’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy network, carries some pitfalls, though it has set the pace for greater stability.

The move precedes the scheduled retirement of Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha on March 18 this year. Though not necessarily always acknowledged, the ISI plays a key role in Pakistan’s vital foreign relations, notably with the US.

After Pakistan’s relations with Washington dipped into a cooling-off period in recent months following the killing of 26 Pakistan army soldiers on the Afghan border in a western helicopter attack from Afghanistan, it was hardly surprising that the ISI became involved with advising the government over how best to proceed. In the aftermath of this attack, Pakistan immediately banned the use of a land supply route through the country for western military cargo heading to Afghanistan.

Though the matter is currently being discussed and debated by the Pakistani parliament’s committee on national security, institutions like the ISI have played a key role in these discussions. But going forward, Pakistan needs to evolve a broad consensus on future ties with the US.

Almost four years after the present civilian government took charge of the country and ended the rule of military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan however remains surrounded by many challenges. Many of these challenges are indeed of the government’s own making, driven mainly by its failure to improve the management of politics and the country’s economic outlook.

For instance, events leading to the change at the top-level of the ISI themselves adequately demonstrate the gaps in the way Pakistan is run. For weeks prior to the change, Pakistan witnessed widespread speculation over how the country’s premier spy agency will function in the future.

Some even speculated that a delay in the announcement of the parliament’s national security committee’s findings may have in part been driven by the delay in the appointment of a new head of the ISI.

Rather than rely on an army-run agency to conceive a vital element of foreign policy, Pakistan needs to instead focus on strengthening its key political institutions. Instead of an agency like the ISI guiding the government and the parliament, the country needs to be guided by its elected representatives.

The upside of the change at the ISI may however be that it has finally taken place. Not too long ago, Pakistan was surrounded by speculation that Gen Pasha, already the beneficiary of his term of office being extended twice, may get another extension. His departure now at least creates the hope of establishing fixed tenures for individuals in high places.

Unstructured approach

As for future relations with the US, Pakistan now needs to focus on promoting its best national interests. This must be done with the parliament firmly taking charge of a process to adequately review not just events of the past few months since the killing of the 26 Pakistani soldiers. Indeed, there must be a consideration of the history of US-Pakistan relations and the best way forward.

The lack of an institutional approach and the recurring imposition of the military’s rule over Pakistan has meant that the country has been locked periodically in phases of adhocism. This has ultimately meant that an unstructured approach has prevailed over ties with the US. The most glaring example of this lack of structure surrounding Pakistan’s ties with the US came in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Within hours of those attacks, Musharraf, Pakistan’s military dictator at the time, jumped in the fray and offered his country’s support to the US-led “war on terror”.

The downside of that choice, which continues to haunt Pakistan to this day, was the failure to document the terms under which the relationship was to be built. It is hardly surprising that on matters like the use of pilotless drones by the CIA to target suspected militants on Pakistani soil, there is still no document that outlines the terms agreed to by Pakistan.

In the absence of a structure surrounding Pakistan’s relations with the US, it is hardly surprising that the helicopter attack of last November immediately froze the relationship. Taking forward Pakistan’s relations with the US is not just about repairing the damage. More vitally, it must be about how the relationship must now be conducted in the country’s best interests.

Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters.
Source: Gulf News
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Hijacking Foreign Policy?

IT is trite to say that no foreign policy can succeed unless it enjoys popular support.

It is, however, equally valid to assert that a foreign policy, formulated after full deliberation in the light of the national interest, must not be sacrificed at the altar of popular moods or sectional interests.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had to face an acute dilemma on whether or not to attend the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Colombo.

The Hindu reported on Nov 5 that the external affairs ministry had recommended that he should go in view of India’s “paramount security and strategic interests” in and around Sri Lanka. The Prime Minister’s Office agreed.

But the cabinet and ‘the Core Group’ in the Congress were split; not on whether participation in the CHOGM was in the national interest but in deference to whipped up regional emotions in the state of Tamil Nadu.

The divide was exclusively on regional lines. India goes to the polls in 2014. The two main political parties in Tamil Nadu, the ruling All India Anna Munnetra Dravida Kazhagam and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, have been locked in a contest on which of them cares more for the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Congress party in that state did not want to lag behind.

Two ministers of state, V. Narayanasamy and Jayanti Natarajan, joined the union shipping minister, G.K. Vasan, in voicing their opposition to the proposed trip. In the Congress Core Group, Finance Minister P. Chidambaram and Defence Minister A.K. Antony opposed the visit. All hail from Tamil Nadu, bar A.K. Antony.

Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha got the state assembly to adopt a unanimous resolution urging the prime minister not to go to Colombo. She cited the Canadian prime minister’s decision not to participate in the CHOGM.

It is impossible to exaggerate the impact of the prime minister’s absence on public opinion in Sri Lanka and on its leaders even if India was represented at the CHOGM by External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. The prime minister’s participation in the CHOGM would have enabled him to engage at a high level with Sri Lanka’s leaders on issues that matter and would have sent a strong message to other chief ministers that he would not grant them a veto on his government’s decisions on foreign policy.

This is precisely what the volatile chief minister of West Bengal Mamata Banerjee has done. She has succeeded in preventing signature on an important agreement, which India concluded with Bangladesh, to the embarrassment of the prime ministers of both countries. On Nov 9, it was revealed that Dr Singh would not attend the CHOGM after all.

No sensible government will conclude an agreement with a neighbouring country without consulting the leaders of the region which shares a border with that country. But this is a far cry from giving the states a veto on the centre’s considered decisions on foreign affairs. It is a sad day for India’s foreign policy.

Trust the chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, a candidate for the prime ministerial office, to muddy the waters. His party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, has always stood for a centralist polity. On Oct 18, in his first speech on foreign policy, he betrayed all too clearly his ignorance on the subject and, incidentally, his unfitness for the high office to which he ardently aspires.

The demagogue even asked why important international conferences and summits should not be held in the states. That he had in mind some degree of participation by the state government emerged from his claim that it would provide the states’ bureaucracy with some exposure. Each state in the federation should be allowed to have partnership with one country.

All this is the stuff of sheer ignorance on the subject on which Modi so confidently held forth. Precisely what does that ‘partnership’ imply and entail? Chief ministers have freely negotiated deals on water and economic issues with leaders of foreign countries.

But, ignorant assertions should not blind all who believe in the concept of a genuine federalism to the fact that in this day and age the process involves some role to the federating units in the realm of foreign affairs.

In June 1948, the Indian government offered to the Nizam of Hyderabad a draft ‘Heads of Agreement’ on defence, foreign affairs, and communications. They were reserved for the Indian government with a qualification: “Hyderabad will, however, have freedom to establish trade agencies in order to build up commercial, fiscal, and economic relations with other countries; but these agencies will work under the general supervision of, and in the closest cooperation with the Government of India. Hyderabad will not have any political relations with any country.”

Do the states of the Indian Union not deserve as much respect? Every federal constitution has room for growth.

In Australia an all-party constitutional convention resolved on April 29, 1983 that the federal treaty-making power should not be abused to undermine the states’ autonomy. Later, a conference adopted ‘Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth — State Consultation on Treaties’.

It fell into three parts: consultation, treaty negotiation process, and federal-state aspects. A detailed procedure was laid down. “Where state interest is apparent, the Commonwealth should, wherever practicable, seek and take into account the views of the states in formulating Australian policy and keep the states informed of the determined policy.”

Already in certain cases, states’ representatives were included in delegations to “international conferences which deal with state subject matters.” It observes that “The purpose is not to share in the making of policy decisions or to speak for Australia” but to ensure that the states know what is afoot and are in a position “to put a viewpoint to the Commonwealth”. This is a fair approach. Some Indian states’ claims go much beyond this.

The writer is an author and a lawyer based in Mumbai.
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An incoherent Foreign Policy

by KAISER BENGALI

THE landmark agreement between the US and its allies and Iran on the nuclear issue is a regional and global game changer.

A new world alignment appears to be emerging that places the US and other western powers on more or less the same platform as China, Iran and India.

The world of eyeball to eyeball confrontation with fingers on the nuclear trigger ended with the Soviet Union’s collapse. Thereafter, the US attempt to act as the sole superpower ended with the Iraq and Afghanistan fiascos. Realising that a multipolar world has emerged, the US appears to have more or less set aside the containment policywith regard to China and opted for a policy of ‘competitive cooperation’ instead.

A fundamental rethink also appears to be under way in the US Middle East policy, which has over the last eight decades been guided by the West’s energy security needs. Israel was planted in the region exclusively for that purpose.

However, technological advances have enabled the US and Canada to tap shale oil and placed oil self-sufficiency on the North American horizon.

Freedom from dependency on Middle Eastern oil is likely to allow the US to loosen itself from half-a-century-old policy pegs and venture into new directions. The brusque manner in which Israeli and Saudi concerns regarding Iran have been brushed aside may indicate the shape of things to come.

These fundamental changes imply that Pakistan too may need to rethink its regional policy parameters. From the 1950s, Pakistan trapped itself in a ‘surrogacy syndrome’ and accepted US patronage, which reached its peak during the 1980s under Gen Zia, and continued under Gen Musharraf.

Over the last decade, however, Pakistan-US ties have lost their sheen. Pakistan now appears to be seeking a strategic shift towards China as a counterweight to the US.

The fact is that Pakistan’s foreign policy has now lost all semblance of coherence or direction. Its foreign policy has been completely India-centric and managed on parameters fixed in concrete. It is like a boxer whose feet are glued to the ground and who, as a result, cannot make the moves to tackle the oncoming punches.

Having abandoned, de facto, the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, Pakistan no longer has any Kashmir policy other than to try to bleed India; a policy that has failed to hurt India, but is bleeding Pakistan instead.

Rather, its policy of patronising and using terrorist proxies as foreign policy tools has made it suspect in the eyes of almost every government (including that of most Muslim countries) and lost it respect. This includes Iran and, to an extent, even China.

Pakistan may claim to have made sacrifices for Afghanistan, but Pakistanis are detested by almost every segment of the Afghan population. On account of their post-2001 betrayal, even the Afghan Taliban do not trust Pakistan anymore. Pakistan stands friendless regionally and globally.

Pakistan’s foreign policy establishment has always been divided between the Foreign Office and GHQ, with the former playing more of a post office role and ISI upstaging GHQ on occasion.

Now, it has become even more disjointed with the likes of Chaudhry Nisar, Imran Khan, Munawar Hasan and Fazlur Rehman trying to ramrod a Sultan Rahi-Maula Jat style offoreign policy, particularly with respect to America. Fuel to the fire is added by a section of retired military officers and religious parties, America’s darlings in the 1980s and who now feel jilted.

Meanwhile, the US appears to have lost all trust and confidence in Pakistan. While an ally in the ‘war on terror’, many top Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders have been netted or killed in Pakistan. They include leaders nabbed from the residences of religious political party leaders and the Al Qaeda chief himself who was traced to within a mile of the Kakul cantonment.

More recently, an Afghan Taliban leader was murdered in the outskirts of Islamabad and other senior Afghan Taliban military commanders were killed in a US drone strike in Hangu. That these gentlemen did not have a visa to enter a sovereign nation does not bother the Sultan Rahi-Maula Jat brigade.

While Pakistan’s surrogacy of the US was always deplorable and many faults can be found in the US treatment of its surrogate, the hysteria directed against the US smacks of gross immaturity.

The US-Iran rapprochement is a wake-up call and Pakistan’s foreign policy establishment units — military and civilian, formal and informal, in offices and on the streets — need to read the writing on the wall. Failure would mean that Pakistan would be treated as an irresponsible, lawless, tantrum-prone child and left out of the regional equation.

The US-Iran rapprochement has significant implications for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran shares a long border with Afghanistan and the US is building a modern highway to link Herat near the Iranian border to Kabul via Ghor province in south-central Afghanistan.

It is likely that the Iranian ports emerge as major Afghan transit trade routes, costing Pakistan’s economy dearly. It’s also likely that the US will begin to deal with Afghanistan politically and militarily largely through Iran, bypassing Pakistan.

As such, if Pakistan thinks that it can hold the US hostage vis-à-vis Afghanistan, it may be mistaken. There is a possibility of a US-Iran-India-Afghanistan grouping emerging, and if Pakistan is isolated today, it may be in danger of becoming even more isolated.

The reliance on China is like standing on thin ice, particularly vis-à-vis the US. China has effectively abandoned its traditional support for Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir and now supports the Indian stand — bilateral negotiations; a shift that has gone unreported in the Pakistani media.

As such, China may be unlikely to stand by its traditional alliances for long if Pakistan continues its obstructionist role in the region. Given the tectonic shifts taking place in strategic alignments, it is imperative that Pakistan reviews its policies to date and adopts a policy based on rationality.

The writer is a researcher.
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