The Long Road to Indo-Pak Detente

The Long Road to Indo-Pak Detente

April 16, 2012
Hussain H Zaidi

Given the mutual mistrust and hostility that have characterised relations between India and Pakistan with the attendant enormous economic and social cost, even a seemingly small step towards the shoring up of their relations needs to be welcomed. One such step is the recent meeting between President Zardari and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during Zardari’s one-day “private” visit to India to pay homage to the shrine of a renowned saint.

The visit coincided with the Siachen tragedy in which more than 120 Pakistani soldiers and civilians were trapped by an avalanche-a grim reminder of the potential catastrophe that the antagonism between the two South Asian nuclear powers entails. Just before the presidential visit, Washington had announced a bounty for Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed, whom New Delhi accuses of having masterminded the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.

A recent breakthrough in the bilateral relations is Pakistan’s decision to normalise trade with India, which will culminate in the grant of the most-favoured-nation status (MFN) to that country by the end of this year. Already the positive list for imports from India has been replaced with a negative list comprising about 1,200 products.

Regardless of which of the two countries will derive greater benefits from an opening up of trade-most likely it will be India, which already has a trade surplus of $1.5 billion, because of its better economic indicators-the decision brings out the capability of the two sides to thrash out the thorny issues.

The 40-minute parleys between President Zardari and Prime Minister Singh were held without an agreed agenda. However, the two leaders raised issues bearing upon bilateral relations. However, the two sides differ on the relative importance of the issues, and understandably so. To India, what holds the key to revival of relations with its western neighbour is stepped up action by Pakistani against the militants based inside its territory, particularly the alleged perpetrators of the Mumbai act of terrorism. India has also been pressing Pakistan to extradite the persons allegedly behind the Mumbai carnage. Islamabad hasn’t obliged, because it has no extradition treaty with New Delhi.

Pakistan, on its part, regards the Kashmir issue together with the alleged diversion of the Indus River waters by its eastern neighbour in violation of the 1960 Indus Basin Treaty as the core issues. Islamabad believes that the relations between the two countries should not be held hostage to one issue.

Trade normalisation aside, for quite some time Indo-Pakistani talks, whether they’re on political or working level, have remained inconclusive, creating the impression that the dignitaries don’t mean business and meet just for the fun of it. The talks have achieved nothing, save for the agreement to remain in touch.

That said, it is exceedingly important that the communication channels between the two countries remain open. The Pakistan-India relations are inherently unstable and even a small move or incident can undo the good work done for years. That’s why, more often than not, their leaders have to start from scratch. For this reason, the parleys, whether formal or informal, political or official level, may be welcomed, for this is the only way to settle the issues.

The way forward in Pakistan-India relations is for both sides to come out of their smugness, be willing to make concessions and set out to resolve the issues, rather than just taking them up. In particular, they have to shun the rhetoric of making the talks hostage to what they call the core issues. In the past, Pakistan made the mistake of emphasis on Kashmir over all other issues. At present India is stuck to its stand on the militancy issue.

In all fairness, this is easier said than done: relations between the two countries are so much enmeshed in sentiments and have so little of pragmatism that making a significant shift from its stated position on any “core” issue would be a real challenge for the government in either country.

Regarding New Delhi’s allegation of the involvement of both state and non-state actors of Pakistan in the acts of terrorism in India, Islamabad’s position is that it is a greater victim of terrorism than India and is doing all it can to put down militancy. The West, particularly the US, shares the Indian perception that Pakistani citizens or residents masterminded the Mumbai killings and wants it to crack down on them and bring them to justice. Hence, within a month of the Mumbai killings, the Security Council outlawed Jamaat-ud-Dawa through a resolution passed on December 10, 2008. In compliance with the Security Council resolution, Pakistan’s security forces launched a crackdown on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and arrested its chief, Hafiz Saeed, who was later set free by the courts for want of sufficient evidence. India on its part needs to realise that the war against terrorism is a drawn-out one and expecting quick results would be unrealistic.

As for Kashmir, the core issue from Pakistan’s standpoint, both countries have traditionally adopted a hard stance on that, which has defied attempts to settle the problem. The two sides need to adopt a flexible posture and explore out-of-the-box possibilities for resolving the problem. Pakistan, in particular, needs to realise that a military solution to the Kashmir issue is not possible, and that neither the UN nor the big powers which control it have any intention to get Security Council resolutions on the disputed territory implemented.

Such realisation dawned on the decision-makers in Pakistan during the Musharraf era, when softening of the Line of Control (LoC), together with greater autonomy to Kashmiris and joint oversight by both Pakistan and India, was proposed.

However, this offer did not elicit a positive response from India. Subsequently, the Pakistan government also did not press with the offer, mainly because making “concessions” to India on Kashmir would precipitate intense opposition. The opening paragraph of the historic Simla Agreement concluded in July 1972 reads: “The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.”

However, conflict and confrontation have continued to mar Pakistan-India ties, and their meagre resources remained largely devoted to warfare rather than to the welfare of their people.

Later, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi, Nawaz Sharif and I K Gujral, Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Pervez Musharraf and Mr Vajpayee, and Musharraf and Manmohan Singh expressed such commitments in their meetings. But on each occasion, the process was stalled and bilateral relations worsened. It is high time the two countries learnt from the past and worked for durable peace and development in the region.

The writer is a freelance contributor based in Islamabad. Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com

-The News